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Abstract
Everett’s Relative State Interpretation (aka Many Worlds Interpre-
tation) has gained increasing interest due to the progress understand-
ing the role of decoherence. In order to fulfill its promise as a realistic
description of the physical world, two postulates are formulated. In
short they are 1) for a system with continuous coordinates x, discrete
variable j, and state ψj(x), the density ρj(x) = |ψj(x)|2 gives the
distribution of the location of the system with the respect to the vari-
ables x and j; 2) an equation of motion for the state i~∂tψ = Hψ.
The first postulate gives a connects the mathematical description to
the physical reality, which has been missing in previous versions. The
contents of the standard (Copenhagen) postulates are derived includ-
ing the appearance of Hilbert space and the Born rule. The approach
to probabilities earlier proposed by Greaves replaces successfully the
classical probability concept in the Born rule. The mistakes and mis-
understandings of other proofs of the Born rule are discussed too.
1 Introduction
Early on, quantum mechanics was judged unable to describe the measure-
ment process. The spatial spread of the wave function conflicted with that
each recorded particle was found in a definite place or direction. Born gave
the rule that the wave function absolute squared |ψ|2 gives the probability
distribution [1]. Bohr took the view that quantum mechanics can be used
for the process between preparation and measurement [2]. However, at the
act of measurement, a transition is necessary to “classical” description of
the macroscopic detector. Heisenberg inferred that the wavefunction col-
lapses to the component that is compatible with the measurement result [3].
These views have been called the Copenhagen Interpretation. They did not
explain the transition from quantum to classical or an acceptable mecha-
nism for the collapse. Heisenberg [3] suggested that the measurement give
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random phases to the terms of the quantum state corresponding to different
measurement values. This effect could explain the lack of interference due to
’which way’ measurements, but not the state collapse. In 1958, Heisenberg
advocated that the environment of the detector play need to be taken into
account, without giving any details [4]. The dichotomy between quantum
and classical description or unexplained collapse has been problematic and
led Feynman to write “I think I can safely say that nobody understands
quantum mechanics” [5]. Mermin [6] wrote “shut up and calculate” to sum
up what the Copenhagen Interpretation meant to him.
It has served us well to calculate system properties with the quantum
equations and using Born’s probability rule when applicable. Further in-
vestigations of the foundation of quantum mechanics have been given a low
priority within the physics community. The initial acceptance of the Copen-
hagen interpretation may be understood from that a partial description is
better than no description at all of nature. Nevertheless, a full description
is more desirable than a partial description.
Einstein refused to believe that the fundamental physics is probabilistic
[7]. The quantum physics could at best be an effective theory, covering up
a deeper reality.
The wave function amplitude is sometimes called the probability ampli-
tude [3] as if its sole purpose is to give probabilities 1. That terminology
suggests that a classical particle is lurking behind the scenes. This thinking
is difficult to reconcile with the superposition principle, which is of ultimate
importance. For this hypothetical classical particle to be revealed there has
to be a deviation from the state vector description. However, we have no
evidence for a mechanism that produces any deviation from the unitary evo-
lution of the quantum state vector. The unitary evolution always gives the
proper detailed description of the interaction between a quantum system
and a detector. Notably, Bohr believed that the measurement apparatus is
correctly described by quantum mechanics, though had to be viewed as if it
was a classical apparatus in the actual measurement situation [9].
Quantum physics has been enormously successful in describing the de-
tailed physics of solids, molecules, atoms, nuclei and particle physics. Is it
sensible to claim that this theory only describes what happens in between
preparation and measurement, but not the measurement process? When
you sit on a chair, you do a continuous observation of its stability that is ex-
1Bohr was not comfortable with the term “In this connection, it should also be em-
phasized that the term probability amplitude for the amplitude functions of the matter
waves is part of a mode of expression which, although often convenient, can, nevertheless,
make no claim to possessing general validity.” [8]
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plained by the wave nature of electrons. If the observation makes quantum
physics invalid, how come the chair still holds you up? As we do observa-
tions all the time of phenomena that are explained by quantum mechanics,
it seems that quantum mechanics also describes what happens during mea-
surements.
Everett took an essential step towards erasing the dichotomy between
state vector evolution and measurement in 1957 [10]. In Everett’s interpre-
tation, the state vector completely describes the state of the physical world.
Everett noted that a measurement would lead to entanglement between the
system being measured and the detector. An observer that reads of the de-
tector can be viewed as being another detector that measures this entangled
state and hence gets entangled with it.
After the measurement, the total state is (still) a sum over all possibil-
ities of the measured system. Each term describes the detector in a state
of the precise value of the measured property. The measured system and
the observer are in a state corresponding to that value. These terms were
denoted branches and, according to Everett, the observer has experienced
that one particular value was measured. However, the observed value differs
between the branches. Within the branches our experiences of consistency
between observers and between the findings in measurements and further
investigations of the measured system2. The problems of previous interpre-
tations seem to be resolved, though some essential aspects were missing or
insufficiently treated.
Firstly, it was not shown that the branches could not interfere, which is
necessary for the branching to be well defined. Zeh [12] noted this problem
and realized that its solution was what we now call decoherence [13, 14, 15].
It is the effect of entanglement with and within the environment. Decoher-
ence also explains why macroscopic objects stay localized and obey the laws
of classical physics.
Secondly, as Everett’s theory aims to describe the process of measure-
ment in quantum mechanical terms, the Born rule probabilities should be
derived from the theory. Everett attempted this, but his argumentation was
insufficient, see section 6.
Thirdly, there is no physical interpretation of the state vector. This lack
is a fundamental shortcoming of Everett’s theory. He writes [10] “The wave
function is taken as the basic physical entity with no a priori interpretation.
2Already 1939 London and Bauer [11] analyzed measurements as entangling between
system and detector and eventually with the observer. They seem to have failed to observe
the ’objectivity’ within a branch
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Interpretation comes after an investigation of the logical structure of the
theory”. By several proponents of Everett’s quantum mechanics is given a
purely mathematical character by defining the theory as vectors of Hilbert
space that evolve according to the quantum equations [16, 17, 18]. This for-
mulation gives the impression that the theory is purely mathematical and
has no physical content. The following quote from Tegmark [17] illustrates
“ ... postulates in English regarding interpretation would be (mathemati-
cally) derivable and thus redundant”. Kent [19] and Maudlin [20] has found
the theory to be empty of physical content. Maudlin writes “Taking away
the measurement postulates ... robs the textbook recipe of any empirical
consequences”.
The choice of explicit Hilbert space gives the physical content. By defin-
ing the meaning of the variables of the wavefunctions regarding position
variables for specific types of particles, or the corresponding definition of
the quantum fields, the physical content can be achieved. However, it re-
quires additional explanation which has been missing.
A notable exception is the works of Vaidman, where he introduced a
postulate that defines what the values of the probabilities [21] for the differ-
ent branches or the corresponding betting preferences [22]. This postulate
avoids the criticism but introduces the notions of probability for a sentient
being or betting preferences, which seems alien to Everett’s project. Sen-
tient beings should have no special role, as it is assumed that they can be
described as quantum systems. Not only does it make the theory less con-
vincing, but it also fails to justify the use of decoherence theory to define
the branches.
Equations that describe physical processes always need to be interpreted.
Ballantine [23] makes this clear in the following quote “from the formalism
f = ma, one cannot deduce that f is a force, m is a mass, and a is an accel-
eration”. Without an interpretation, there can be no meaning to expressions
derived from the wave function. There has to be: (1) a correspondence be-
tween the quantities that enter into the equations and well defined physical
phenomena and observations; (2) an understanding of what the equations
can describe, their region of applicability.
The purpose of this article is to give an interpretation of the quantum
state, suitable to describe the measurement as a quantum unitary evolution
including how the Born rule arises. For this end, the quantum theory is sup-
plied with a new set of postulates replacing the traditional postulates. The
new postulates are presented in section 2. How the traditional measurement
postulates, except for the Born rule, are derived from the new postulates is
presented in section 3. In section 4 it is presented the description of mea-
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surements on many equally prepared systems. The perception of the Born
rule for a typical observer is presented in 5. A discussion of other attempts
to prove the Born rule is given in section 6. Conclusions and final remarks
are presented in section 8.
2 Postulates
In Heisenberg’s article [24] that came to be the starting point of quantum
mechanics, he aimed to replace the notion of a definite position of the elec-
tron with a quantity that could give transition probabilities using the clas-
sical dipole radiation formulas. He also aimed to reach a theory that could
be generalized to more systems than the Bohr-Sommerfeld orbits could be
applied to. Thus quantum mechanics is about position, though the particle
position concept is different from classical mechanics.
Schro¨dinger [25] sought to find an equation for a (wave) function of
space, that could give the quantized energies. At the large quantum number
limit, there is a clear correspondence between wave function and the classical
mechanical orbit, at least for integrable systems. Thus, the wave function
replaces the where and how of the classical orbit.
Postulate EQM 1 The meaning of the quantum state: The state is a set
of complex functions of positions
Ψ = {ψj(t,x1,x2, ...)} (1)
where j is a discrete index, for example spin and gauge components. Its
basic interpretation is given by that the density
ρj(t,x1,x2, . . .) = |ψj(t,x1,x2, . . .)|2 (2)
answers where the system is in position, spin, etc. It is absolute square
integrable and normalized to one∫ ∫
· · · dx1dx2 · · ·
∑
j
|ψj(t,x1,x2, . . .)|2 = 1. (3)
This requirement signifies that the system has to be somewhere, not every-
where. If the value of the integral is zero, the system does not exist anywhere.
With the usual way of denoting the norm ‖ · ‖, equation (3) can be
written ‖Ψ‖ = 1.
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If something is possible to measure, then it is possible to separate such
a small part from the rest. The separated part will act as a system of
its own, thus cannot have zero norm. The difference between two states
Ψand Ψ′ for which ‖Ψ−Ψ′‖ = 0 can have no measurable consequences, as
Ψ−Ψ′ is, according to EQM1, physically equivalent to a function being zero
everywhere. This equivalence implies that the state of the system can be
viewed as a vector in the Hilbert space of functions of the type (1), see the
appendix.
If the index j contains gauge components, these may be summed over in
equation (2) to get a gauge independent density. The state vector ψ is not
directly observable as it is gauge dependent.
The EQM1 gives us a necessary element of understanding of the quan-
tum state. For example, from the hydrogen groundstate wavefunction, we
get where we can find that electron. From some parts of the quantum state
of the experiment as a whole we can conclude what and where is the detec-
tor. Neither what nor where could be answered without any interpretation
In the Copenhagen interpretation; the Born rule gives the corresponding in-
formation. For anyone that has learned quantum mechanics from standard
textbooks, it has become the intuitive understanding of the wavefunction.
Formally, it is nevertheless necessary to define its meaning. The criticisms
[19, 20] clearly proves that.
The density gives how much the system is present at a location in con-
figuration space x1,x2, . . ., with the discrete index j. The density can be
denoted the position distribution or the presence distribution, and both will
be used here. The quantity presence has previously been denoted measure
of existence by Vaidman [21] and caring measure by Greaves [26, 27], but
they have not fully clarified its meaning.
EQM1 gives the relation between the theory and what is going on in
the laboratory, the world or the universe. It also turns out that EQM1
becomes a powerful tool to uncover the appearance of the Born rule. The
interpretation that EQM1 provides can also be given by postulating that
the wavefunction belongs to the Hilbert space of functions of the particular
variables and indexes. The Hilbert norm is then the measure of position
or presence. The disadvantage with such a postulate is the difficulty in
explaining the physical meaning of the norm. This difficulty is illustrated
by that no one seems to have fully understood it. Additionally, it is backward
to start with postulating which mathematics should be used and then derive
the physics from that.
Geroch [28] suggested a related interpretation of the quantum state
which states that a region of configuration space is ‘precluded’ if the wave-
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function is very small there. This suggestion corresponds to ignoring con-
tributions from configuration space where the system is hardly present.
Postulate EQM 2 The equation of motion: There is a linear and unitary
time development of the state, e.g.,
i~∂tΨ = HΨ, (4)
where H is the hermitian Hamiltonian. The term unitary signifies that the
value of the left hand side in (3) is a constant of motion for any state (1)
of the system.
When investigating how the theory describes the world we observe the
Hamiltonian has to have realistic features.
The quantum world around us is understood in terms of local inter-
actions. The standard model of particle physics is formulated in terms
of locally interacting fields. These properties imply that we only have to
understand and interpret quantum mechanics with local interactions. In
particular, measurement processes are physical processes confined to the in-
teractions available. In connection with measurements, it can be assumed
that there are locally conserved currents.
In EQM1 there is no mention of any relation between the density (pres-
ence) (2) and probability. When the propagation of different parts is depen-
dent on each other due to coherence, the concept of probability is not rele-
vant. However, the density ρj(t,x1,x2, . . .) as a distribution of the particles
positions is always relevant. It is similar to Schro¨dinger’s original interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics [29], in which for a single electron −eρ(x) was
assumed to be a (classical) charge density. Schro¨dinger wrongly assumed it
could be used in Maxwell’s equations.
The following relations lends support to the interpretation of the density
ρ as the distributed position. For the sake of simplicity, the discrete index
j, as well as the time dependence are omitted here.
(i) A single particle in a local potential obey the continuity equation,
∂tρ+∇ · j = 0, (5)
where j is the conventional current. This shows that the particle po-
sition distribution changes in a continuous manner.
(ii) The correction to the energy for a bound single particle disturbed by
a local static potential V (x) is to first order
∆E =
∫
d3xV (x)ρ(x). (6)
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An outside agent that interacts with the system weakly enough not to
essentially change the state will find that it interacts with a distribu-
tion, not with a particle in a definite position.
(iii) We can define the average position as the first moment of the density
distribution
〈x〉 =
∫
d3xxρ(x). (7)
According to Ehrenfest theorem, if the force F = ∂xV is essentially
constant in the region where the density is appreciable, the average
position will move according to Newtons Law,
m
d2
dt2
〈x〉 = F (8)
If the width of the density distribution is “small” it gives the position
of a particle moving along as classical particle.
(iv) The particles are not at positions where the density is zero.
(v) From molecular, atomic, nuclear and particle physics it is well estab-
lished that the single particle density of N electrons, protons or quarks
ρ(x) = N
∫
d3x2d
3x3 · · · ρ(x,x2,x3, . . .) (9)
gives the charge density if multiplied with the charge a single particle.
In the Oppenheimer-Born approximation, the nuclei interact with the
(instantaneous) charge distribution of the electrons as given by equa-
tion 9.
In nuclear physics, the comparison between calculated charge distri-
bution and experimental is an important method to test theories, see
[30].
(vi) The dependence of ρj(x1,x2, . . .) on all the different degrees of free-
dom in strongly interacting systems is impossible to uncover in a non-
destructive method as in (ii). Information about correlations can be
extracted from inelastic scattering. We can also get a clue to them
from theoretical considerations of the energy and other static proper-
ties of bound states. For example, atoms with half-filled valence sub-
shell, with fixed n and l quantum numbers, have maxim spin value and
maxim total orbital angular momentum as the antisymmetric spatial
electron wavefunction minimizes the Coulomb repulsion.
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The position of separate compound subsystems can be measured in a
similar way as for a single particle in (ii).
(vii) Position is the fundamental quantity of classical mechanics and from
that all other classical physics concepts. The classical physics can be
discussed from where things are without having to understand exactly
how the properties of macroscopic objects emerge.
This listing shows that if we wish to interpret the meaning of ρj(x1,x2, . . .)
without any attention to the measurement process, the interpretation that is
given by EQM1 or something to the same effect seems unavoidable.
Below are listed the Copenhagen Interpretation postulates.
C1 The state of a physical system is a normalized vector |Ψ〉 in a Hilbert
space H which evolves unitarily with time.
C2 Every measurable quantity is described by a Hermitian operator (ob-
servable) B acting in H.
C3 The only possible result of measuring a physical quantity is one of the
eigenvalues of the corresponding observable B.
C4 The probability for obtaining eigenvalue b in a measurement of B is
P (b) = 〈Ψ|pib|Ψ〉, where pib is the projector onto the eigen-subspace of
B having eigenvalue b.
C5 The post-measurement state is (the result of the unitary development
during the measurement of) pib|Ψ〉/P (b)1/2.
Some modern formulations of the postulates allow for positive operator
value measurements, but that generalization offers nothing extra here. It
is the same as the projection value measurement postulates C2-5 up to a
unitary transformation [31].
In the discussion of EQM1 above, it was shown that it is a consequence
that the state belongs to a Hilbert space so that EQM1 and 2 imply the
content C1.
As the measurement process is a physical process described by the dy-
namics (EQM2), no new postulates are corresponding to C2-5. How do real
physical measurement processes correspond to the C-postulates? In order to
answer that question, this article will not address everyday observations but
confine the discussion to measurements in designated experimental setups.
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3 Basics of Measurements
It is difficult to analyze, which quantities can be measured based on all con-
ceivable experimental setups. However, an understanding of the fundamen-
tals of measurements can be achieved from the fundamentals of detectors.
Detectors can typically record that a particle entered it, which can be used
to create position information. The momentum of a charged particle can be
transformed into a measurement of position. The measurement of photon
energy can be transformed into the measurement of position using a grat-
ing. The measurement of angular momentum of an atom can be transformed
into a photon energy measurement by the Zeeman effect or position by a
Stern-Gerlach apparatus. These are examples of measurements of physical
quantities which correspond to Hermitian operators. Even the measurement
of the time for an event is in principle transformable to a position measure-
ment
It is reasonable to assume that all types of measurements transform
the property in question to measure position or simply counting particles,
primary or secondary. Alternatively, the measurement procedure is related
to that in the way it is calibrated. The following discussion of measurements
will be confined to the recording of a particle entering a detector. This
detector may be a part of an array of detectors in order to get position
information from which detector was hit.
Particle recording detectors react when a particle is entering a particular
volume or area. There is an infinite set of states with support inside the
volume (area) and another infinite set of orthonormal states with support
only outside. Together they make up a complete basis. The Hermitian
operator that corresponds to measurements with this detector can be defined
such that all the inside states are eigenstates with a common eigenvalue and
the outside with another value. This detector can only tell whether a particle
came into it or not. A less crude position detector may be constructed by
placing several such particle recorders at different positions. The Hermitian
operator for this composite detector may be constructed by associating the
same value for all states inside one particle recorder, but different values for
different recorders. Additionally, another value should be attributed to the
outside of all particle recorders. This detector records if any of the individual
particle recorders fired and which fired and there is a Hermitian operator
with eigenvalues corresponding to the different recordings.
Obviously, the detector described so far is highly idealized. For example,
it is unrealistic that a particle recording detector can register particles at any
energy. However, at a specific experiment, the energy range of the particles
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is limited. The described model is relevant as long the efficiency is close to
100% in the real experiment.
It is assumed that the measurement setup is such that, which particle
recorder the particle reaches is given by its value of the property being
measured. There is a unitary operator
U = exp(−iHet/~) (10)
corresponding to the Hamiltonian He that describes this part of the exper-
imental setup.
Denote the Hermitian operator that corresponds to the position detector
with Y . The operator Bbeing measured by Y and the unitary evolution U
is given by
B = U †Y U. (11)
The eigenstates |b〉 of B are related to eigenstates of Y by
|y〉 = U |b〉. (12)
As described above, each eigenvalue of Y is typically degenerate. According
to (11), the same applies to B, but as noted above in an actual experiment
only a small number of states are involved. For simplicity, it is assumed that
only one state per particle recorder is relevant.
ffifl
fi
|ψ〉


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c3|b3〉
U
-c2|b2〉 U
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c1|b1〉 U
c3|y3〉
c2|y2〉
c1|y1〉
D3
D2
D1
Figure 1: The position detector consisting is the particle recorders D1-D3
receive the different components of the wave function |ψ〉 due to the unitary
transformation U . The state |an〉 transforms to |yn〉 by U .
The state to be measured is written in the eigenstates to B,
|ψ〉 =
∑
b
cb|b〉. (13)
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The state that enters the position detector system is∑
b
cbU |b〉 =
∑
b
cb|yb〉. (14)
This expresses that the different eigenstates |b〉 enters separate particle
recorders and is there represented by |yb〉, see figure 1. As the functions
yb(j,x) with differing value of b have disjoint spatial support, the density of
the state (14) is
ρj(x) =
∑
b
|cb|2|yb(j,x)|2. (15)
It describes where the system is according to EQM1. Summation over
the spin and integration over the volume of one of the particle recorders
will give the value |cb|2, where b is the eigenvalue of B associated with that
recorder. The interpretation of this result is that
ρb = |cb|2 (16)
as a function of the discrete variable b tells where the system is for the
eigenvalue of B. Note that this result is an important step towards replacing
the old axioms C2 and C3 with EQM1 and EQM2.
So far, the interaction between the particle and the detector has been
ignored. The decoherence necessary for a measurement to happen relies on
this interaction, see section 3.1.
In order to simplify the notation, it will be assumed that the state |ψ〉
(13), instead of the transported state (14), directly interacts with the (com-
posite) detector. Then, the interaction with the detector M is described
by3
(
∑
b
cb|b〉)|Mφ〉 →
∑
b
cb|b〉′|Mb〉. (17)
The detector changes its state from its nothing registered state |Mφ〉 to a
state |Mb〉 consistent with having registered the state |b〉. The state of the
system before the measurement |b〉 and after |b〉′, may be the same. In
reality, there are a set of states of the detector that all correspond to the
value b. This and similar complications are henceforth ignored.
According to Everett, the observation process is described by
(
∑
b
cb|b〉′|Mb〉)|Oφ〉 →
∑
b
cb|b〉′|Mb〉|Ob〉, (18)
3For simplicity, the terms of the lefthand side (17) are written as if the incoming state
|b〉 stops interacting with the detector. It can be captured for a long time in which case
it is not a product state.
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where the state of the state of the observer O is altered to having observed
the value that the detector has measured. Equally, a friend F will also
get entangled, if F is told what value O has measured, or reads the detec-
tor value. This entanglement guarantees the consistency between observers.
The distribution ρb gives the position of the total system over the branches.
Another way to express this, the value of ρb gives the presence at the branch
with outcome b of the observer and everything else entangled with the mea-
surement result.
The particular measurement setup which the present discussion uses may
seem to be too specialized. There exist other measurement methods, they
are usually calibrated using the type of measurement discussed here. Other
methods are accepted if they agree with the type of measurements of figure
1.
Another way energy detectors may be calibrated is to deposit a macro-
scopic number of particles known to have the same energy (distribution) into
some container and measure the deposited macroscopic energy by classical
(calorimetric) means. Also, in this case, is the measured value is at some
point converted to a position.
Note, that a current or a voltage is at some stage converted to one or
several positions in terms of a pointer or positions of charges in a digital
memory or display. The general feature is that measurements results are
sooner or later manifested as positions, which emphasizes the prudence of
EQM1.
3.1 Decoherence: Selector and Protector
There is an ambiguity in the transformation (17). If |ψ〉 is written in another
basis |x〉 that are eigenstates to operator X, then we get
(
∑
x
dx|x〉)|Mφ〉 →
∑
x
dx|x〉′|M ′x〉. (19)
where the detector states |M ′x〉 are linear combinations of the states |Mb〉.
From (19) it might look like it the quantity X that has been measured.
However, the assumed experimental setup, figure 1, with realistic properties
of the particle recorders guarantees that B is measured, as expression (17)
suggests.
When a particle recorder is excited because the system enters it, very
many degrees of freedom get excited. Very soon after the initial excitation,
any operator T that can give a non-zero matrix element between different
13
|Mb〉 states
〈Mb|T |Mb′〉 6= 0, b 6= b′, (20)
need to be extremely complicated. It has to be an operator that touches
as many particles as has been excited in the two different particle recorders
corresponding to b and b′. Additionally, T has to depend on the exact
initial state of the particle recorders. The probability that nature, with or
without the involvement of humans, will supply a process corresponding to
such an operator T is FAPP zero. This property implies that we cannot
experience any of the detectors states |M ′x〉 as an observation of such a
state, entails an interference between |Mb〉 states. The measurement process
creates decoherence between terms with different values of B.
As the particle recorders are in contact with its environment, it will influ-
ence the environment such that it will reflect its state. Hence, also particles
in the near environment change their state which further strengthens the de-
coherence. That will continue to parts of the environment even further out
and so on. The readout of the state of the detector that the experimenter
has made to happen is one such process that increases the decoherence by
having more physical systems to change their state in a way that reflects
the initial excitation of the detector.
Due to the lack of any interference effects between the terms in the
state that results from the structure of the detector and the coupling to the
environment, , ∑
b
cb|b〉′|Mb〉|b〉, (21)
can be thought of as isolated systems. DeWitt called them “worlds” but
Everett named them “branches” which seems more appropriate.
Once, the measured data is stored into some memory constructed to be
resilient and with considerable redundancy, that itself is enough to hinder
any coherence between the possible measurement values. For example, if
the data that is written on a piece of paper, the molecules of ink or ‘lead’
that attach to the paper are not likely to lose their position by quantum
spreading. They attach to the paper and each other, forming macroscopic
structures. It is well known that macroscopic structures are measured con-
tinuously by their surroundings [13]. The quantum Zeno effect then implies
that the quantum uncertainty of the position of the writing will be minimal.
If nothing else protects from coherence between the terms of (21), the way
we store the data guarantees that we will not notice any effects of coherence.
Vaidman [32] has defined ‘worlds’ as having different macroscopic struc-
ture. This might not be the appropriate general definition of a branch.
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However, successful measurement results give rise to different macroscopic
structures, so the branches that are discussed here is precisely Vaidman
‘worlds’.
There is a suggestion from Hanson [33, 34] that low-density branches can
get ‘mangled’ by large density branches. The mangling is caused by residual
coherence of branches. However, as soon a branch is created in which val-
ues are recorded and given well protected macroscopic manifestations, any
effects of recoherence are negligible. The problem of the ‘competition’ be-
tween small and relatively large density branches is a practical experimental
issue related to the creation of the branches. It is a well-known difficulty
to measure values u that have very low density ρu. Large density branches
ρb  ρu tend to interfere with the observation of the low-density value. The
general term for this experimental problem is ‘cross-talk’.
The derivation of the decoherence mechanism is based on the traditional
interpretation of quantum mechanics [12, 35]. Joos [36] and Tappenden
[37] questioned the use of decoherence theory to infer the Born rule as it is
already assumed. However, decoherence theory primarily relies on the Born
rule to conclude that the environmental particles are ‘measured’ somewhere
after that they scattered off ‘macroscopic’ systems that are then found to
be localized. The interpretation (ontology) given by EQM1 serves well to
replace the Born rule in decoherence theory.
3.2 The Measurement Result
So far, it has been established that the measurement setup as in figure 1
can create one well-defined branch for every possible measurement value,
which are eigenvalues to a Hermitian operator. The quantum state of the
branch is that of the eigenstate (with amplitude cb) entering the detector.
The Copenhagen postulates C1, C2, and C3, section 2, are fulfilled in each
branch, as well as C5 if the current branch is renormalized to norm 1 by the
observer within a branch4.
Looking at the many branches from the outside the question “What
reading did the observer get?” is equivalent to “What is the distribution of
observer readings?” - The answer is given by the distribution ρb (16). This
value can also be arrived at calculating the total density (the norm) of the
b-term in the final state of (17) or (18). Note that once decoherence has
4Zurek [38] proved under the assumption of non-disturbing measurement that the mea-
sured basis states have to be orthogonal in order for the measurement apparatus to dif-
ferentiate them.
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taken place, the created branches evolve independently keeping their norms
conserved.
4 Repeated Measurements
Suppose the detector is able to record several subsequent measurements
of identically prepared systems (13). Further, assume that the way the
detector interacts with the next system is not essentially affected by previous
measurements. The second measurement is described by the transition
(
∑
b2
cb2 |b2〉)
∑
b1
cb1 |b1〉′|Mb1〉 →∑
b1b2
cb2cb1 |b2〉′|b1〉′|Mb1b2〉. (22)
When the interaction with the observer is included the final state becomes∑
b1b2
cb2cb1 |b2〉′|b1〉′|Mb1b2〉|Ob1b2〉. (23)
Each sequence of readings belong to different branches. The distribution of
observer reading sequences is now
ρb1b2 = |cb1 |2|cb2 |2. (24)
After N measurements, the sequences of observer readings are distributed
according to
ρb1b2...bN = |cb1 |2|cb2 |2 · · · |cbN |2. (25)
When N is large, the relative frequencies of the values of b became inter-
esting. To focus on the value b = u, denote the summed density of all the
other values of b by
ρ¬u =
∑
b 6=u
|cb|2 (26)
and ρu = |cu|2. The sum of the densities (25) over all sequences where b = u
appears precisely m times out of N measurements
ρ(m :N |u) = N !
(N −m)!m! (ρu)
m(ρ¬u)N−m. (27)
This gives the total summed density of the branches in which the observer
has found the value u, m times. Hence, the question ’how many times
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have the observer measured the value u’ is answered by ρ(m : N |u) as a
distribution over m-values.
For large number of measured systems N , the distribution (27) may be
approximated by a gaussian, see Feller [39],
ρ(m :N |u) ≈ 1
(2piNρuρ¬u)1/2
exp (− (m−Nρu)
2
2Nρuρ¬u
). (28)
The distribution (28) may be represented as function of the relative fre-
quency z = m/N taken as a continuous variable. The properly normalized
position or presence distribution with respect to z is
ρ(z|u) = ( N
2piρuρ¬u
)1/2 exp (− N(z − ρu)
2
2ρuρ¬u
). (29)
AsN →∞ this density approaches the delta function δ(z−ρu). This relation
says that at infinitely large N there is only one value of the frequency z = ρu.
It might look like as a big stride towards proving Born’s probability rule,
but ρ(z|u) is an approximate result.
To get from the exact expression for ρ(m : N |u) (27) to the continuous
frequency distribution, the interval [0, 1] is divided into a set of intervals
{Ik},
Ik = [0, 1] ∩ [zk −∆z/2, zk + ∆z/2[, zk = ρu + k∆z. (30)
The index k belongs to the minimal set of integers such that {Ik} covers
[0, 1]. Define ρ˜(k) as the sum of densities ρ(m : N |u) with m/N in the
interval Ik. Set
ρ∆z(z|u) = ρ˜(k)/∆z if z ∈ Ik. (31)
This is a histogram type piece-wise constant function. If ∆z = ∆z1/N
−1/2
and ∆z1 is small and N is large, then ρ∆z(z|u) can be arbitrarily close to
ρ(z|u).
In order to adequately justify the use of the frequency distribution (29)
an operator should be found that is closely related to this distribution. The
first guess may be the frequency operator
FN =
1
N
N∑
i=1
fi (32)
where fi operates on the i-th system being measured with f |u〉 = |u〉 and
f |b〉 = 0 if b 6= u. The eigenvalues of FN are z = m/N, m = 1, ..., N . The
density related to FN acting on this state is given by (27) with m replaced by
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zN . As pointed out by Squires [40], the values of this discrete distribution
approaches zero as N →∞.
The operator FN∆z defined by its action on products of eigenstates to
the operator B. If the frequency of the eigenvalue u is in the interval Ik
with midpoint zk, then
FN∆z|bN 〉|bN−1〉...|b1〉 = zk|bN 〉|bN−1〉...|b1〉. (33)
The density of this operator is ρ˜(k). As the eigenvalues zk of FN∆z is a
discrete set its density distribution ρzk = ρ˜(k) is represented be a bar graph
rather than the histogram that represents ρ∆z(z|u).
To see the behavior of these densities as N approaches infinity, the
Chebyshev’s inequality [39] can be applied to the distribution ρ(m : N |u)
(27). The result can be written as∑
|m/N−ρu|>∆z/2
ρ(m : N |u) ≤ 4ρuρ¬u
(∆z)2N
. (34)
From this follows that
∑
k 6=0 ρ˜(k)→ 0 as N →∞ and that ρ˜(0) approaches
one for any value of ∆z. The delta function limit of ρ(z|u) is confirmed by
the exact calculation.
The quantity ρ(z|u) is a continuous approximate representation of ρ(m :
N |u), which is a sum of the densities of several branches. The interpreta-
tion is that ρ(z|u) gives the position distribution with respect to the relative
frequency z of everything entangled with the measurement result. The pres-
ence of the observer within an interval in the relative frequency of length dz
is ρ(z|u) dz.
5 The Born Rule
The frequentists may find that the Born rule is derived from section 4, the
discussion on currents arriving to the detectors 5.1. The pros and cons of
the frequentist view when applied to Everittian quantum probabilities and
the Bayesian view is presented in 5.2. In subsection 5.3 it is shown that the
present theory implies, that in the significant part of the presence, physicists
believe in the Born rule, which should be the most persuasive argument for
the Born rule. The subsection 5.3 discuss the appearance of the Born rule
using the global perspective of all the branches and the distribution of the
observer with respect to her observation of the Born rule. How a rational
agent’s subjective probabilities get confined to the Born rule is shown in
subsection 5.4.
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5.1 The Current View
Born first suggested his rule in connection with scattering theory [1]. The
most common way to derive cross sections involves an incoming current.
Everett’s description of measurement is that the measured system and the
detector scatter against each other. A combination of these ideas give a
description of repeated measurements in terms of currents.
For repeated measurements set up as in figure 1, there is a stream of
particles going in the directions indicated by the arrows. The magnitude of
the currents in each stream is equal to Jb = ρbn, where n is the number of
measurements per time unit. The current Jb equals the average number of
recordings in detector b, per time unit.
After time t, the number of measurements N equals nt. The average
number of recordings in detector u is m = ρuN . The number of recordings
varies between branches. The distribution ρ(m :N |u) gives the total pres-
ence of the branches with m recordings. The discreteness of the number of
recordings m and its variation may be thought of as ‘shot noise’.
The average over branches weighted with their presence of the frequency
m = ρbN shows that the average relative frequency is z = ρb. This relation
is the Born rule! Can this be considered sufficient proof of the Born rule in
EQM?
5.2 Proving Probabilities
Probability is a complicated concept. If a deterministic process gives a single
outcome, probabilities are used to describe and evaluate the situation when
details are not known to with certainty predict the result. The numerical
value of the probability equals the expected relative frequency of a repeated
process. A statistical analysis gives increased knowledge and is used to
constrain probability values.
The common frequentist view is that the probability is the relative fre-
quency from infinitely many repetitions [39, 41]. The following criticism
against the common frequentist view, adapted from Appleby [42, 43] and
Wallace [18], should be responded before accepting a proof relying on the
common frequentist view.
1. C: After infinitely many repetitions, it is possible for the value of the
relative frequency to deviate from the probability. The probability of
such sequences tends to zero, but the use of the notion of probability
makes this definition of probability circular. R: In EQM, all possi-
ble sequences of measurement results together constitute the reality.
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Not only a single sequence as in the case of a single outcome. After
infinitely many repetitions, the universal wavefunction is only located
at the relative frequency z = ρu. The observer sees a random sequence
which suggests an analysis in terms of probability, which, in view of
the behavior of the presence distribution, will be taken to be ρu. This
analysis creates no circularity as presence is a quantity on its own,
not derived from the probability concept. However, the probability
concept does not directly appear from such an analysis.
2. C: It is impossible to make infinitely many repetitions. R: In a theo-
retical analysis, it is possible to consider thought experiments in which
there are infinitely many repetitions.
3. C: There is no well-defined frequency of a particular outcome in an
infinite sequence, as a reordering can change the value. R: The universe
of all of the branches is left unchanged under reordering if all branches
are reordered in the same way with respect their ordinal number in
the sequence. Any other reordering would violate the branches being
the result of repeated experiments.
4. C: Any particular infinite sequence has zero probability, so how can
those with the ‘right frequency’ be favored against the one with an-
other frequency? R: All sequences are present and contribute with its
presence.
5. C: The first (finite) part of an infinite sequence is a vanishingly small
compared with the rest and give no reliable information about the
infinite sequence. R: This is the problem of that statistics of finite
sequences can be misleading. When all branches are studied together,
which we can do theoretically, this will not be a problem.
An alternative to the frequentist view of probabilities is the subjective
view. Even in frequentists description of probability theory, probabilities
are about expectations as evident from the term ‘expectation value’. Prob-
abilities reflect an agent’s estimate of how likely is a particular outcome. It
is often denoted the Bayesian theory of probability and has been advocated
by de Finetti [44] and Savage [45]. The theory concerns the beliefs of ratio-
nal agents for which Savage identified necessary requirements (postulates).
These give a foundation on which the theory of probability could be built.
Most notable in this theory is the update of probabilities a rational agent
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will make on the discovery of new information,
P (A|B) = P (A ∩B)
P (B)
=
P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
. (35)
Here, P (A|B) is the probability of A when the agent know B to be true,
P (A∩B) is the agent’s probability for both A and B, and P (B) is the total
probability for B. It originates from the identity P (A∩B) = P (A|B)P (B) =
P (B|A)P (A). In order to evaluate the update expression, the agent has to
analyze the process that leads to an outcome. The theory is only a skeleton,
which has abstracted away the world which the agent has beliefs about. In
order to get any values of the probabilities, the nature of the world has to
be taken into account by the agent.
5.3 Statistics and One-Worlders
Consider from the EQM point of view an observer, who believes there is no
branching, only one world exists at every time. She is involved in a deliberate
measurement process of a phenomenon where the outcome is uncertain due
to the observed quantum state containing more than one possible value.
After a long sequence of measurements, the observer is distributed over very
many branches. In each branch, a random sequence is observed which call for
a statistical analysis by the observer. The observer will assume that there is
a probability Pu for measuring u in a single measurement. The probability
of the measured relative frequency z after N repeated measurements, for
this value of Pu, is then
P (z|u) = ( N
2piPu(1− Pu))
1/2 exp (− N(z − Pu)
2
2Pu(1− Pu)). (36)
As this is a very narrow distribution for large N , a frequentist analysis would
give that Pu is in some narrow interval around the measured value of the
relative frequency, with some low p-value. The Bayesian analysis, assuming
de Finetti’s infinite exchangeability, gives rise to the probability distribution
for the value of Pu conditioned on the measured relative frequency z,
P (Pu|z) = P (z|u)P (Pu)∫ 1
0 dPu P (z|u)P (Pu)
. (37)
Here, P (Pu) is the prior distribution of Pu. If there is no previous informa-
tion, it will be constant and the dependence of P (Pu|z) on Pu will be given
by P (z|u).
21
The relative frequency z is distributed over all branches according to
(29), see figure 2. Hence, the distribution of Pu over the branches may be
seen as the folding of the two distributions (29) and (36).
Figure 2: The solid line shows the density ρ(z|u) (29) for ρu = 0.3 and
N = 1000. The dotted line shows where an observer in a typical branch may
estimate the probability P (z|u) to be from the observed sequence alone.
As the number of repeated measurements N grows the width of the prob-
ability distribution P (z|u), tends to zero as does the position distribution
ρ(z|u). After a large number of repeated measurements, the observer sees
a relative frequency close to ρu, and the large value of N implies that the
value of Pu is probably close to the observed frequency. Hence, the observer
believes that the probability Pu is very close to the value of ρu.
There is one additional effect that can make the difference between the
values of ρu and Pu go away. That happens if the observer knows what
quantum state the system is in. When the observer sees a relative frequency
close to ρu the observer will likely assume that Pu is precisely ρu, as stated
by the Born rule. This might well be assumed even if the Born rule is
previously not known to the observer, as inventing the Born rule is known
to be possible.
To summarize, the observer distribution in relative frequency (29) is
narrowing in precisely the same fashion as for a classic probability (36). The
integral of ρ(z|u) is dominated by the peak, which implies that the observer’s
position is mostly where the relative frequency is close to ρu. If the observer
believes in a single world interpretation, the observer has arguments for
the statistical analysis. This observer’s position is dominantly where she
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believes in the Born rule. From the point of view of EQM1, where do we
expect to find our selves? If we are to expect anything, our expectation to
be near the peak of ρ(z|u) will be high, and our expectation to be in the far
tails will be low. Our expectation agrees with observation, physicists believe
in the Born rule.
Expectation and probability are very similar concepts, but the word
probability has many precise meanings that need not be considered here.
Nevertheless, what have been addressed here is the self-locating probability
that Barrett have discussed [46]. The situation of self-location uncertainty
proposed by Vaidman [21, 22], where the observer is not aware of the mea-
sured result, is something different.
When the standard interpretation quantum mechanics is verified on
bases of the Born rule, the data is compared with the expectation we have
from the Born rule. As has been demonstrated, EQM gives rise to the same
expectation as the Born rule. This implies that EQM is equally well verified
as the standard interpretation quantum mechanics5.
5.4 Decision Theoretic Probabilities
We have seen that according to the postulates EQM, the observer will typ-
ically have observed a random sequence with a relative frequency close to
the Born rule value. An observer that assumes a single world theory will be-
lieve that there is a probability for the different outcomes given by the Born
rule. What about the believer in the branching world? No doubt, there is
a challenge to argue for the appearance of probability when all alternatives
with non-zero amplitudes are going to be realized.
In classical situations where probabilities apply, there is a level of un-
certainty, and else it is known what happens. Greaves [26] has taken the
view that before a measurement there is no uncertainty for the observer who
believes in EQM. The observer knows that every possibility with non-zero
amplitude is represented in its branch. When observing the outcome, she
will also branch, each of her ‘descendants’ seeing the value of that branch.
Although there is no uncertainty, thus no classical probability, the situation
before the measurement warrants much the same decision theory as when
classical uncertainty is at hand.
In the Bayesian theory [44] the probabilities on a fundamental level are
taken to be subjective beliefs. Probability is related to decisions an agent
5Deutsch [47] seems to assert that statistical evidence is not admissible for the verifi-
cation of a theory, but considering the ultimate importance of such evidence in quantum
physics, he is too restrictive.
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is willing to make [45]. Deutsch [48] pioneered the use of decision theory to
understand Everettian quantum probabilities. Wallace [49, 50, 51, 18] and
Greaves [26, 52] have continued this work in their own directions. Both base
their analysis on the axioms Savage [45] formulated. These axioms define
rules that the beliefs a rational agent should follow. Savage proves that
the rational decision an agent makes is equivalent to the agent choosing the
action that maximizes the expected utility,
〈U〉 =
∑
i
PiUi. (38)
Here Pi is the probability, with
∑
i Pi = 1, and Ui is the numerical value
of the utility that the agent will get on outcome i. From considering the
decisions an agent will make under a variety of situations, and a variety of
utilities the agent might get at the different outcomes, the agent’s subjective
probabilities Pi are uniquely determined, and the utilities Ui are determined
up to an affine transformation. It is not assumed that the agent consciously
considers the probabilities or that she gives the utilities numerical values.
Lewis [53] acknowledges that even if probabilities are primarily subjec-
tive, there are instances like radioactive decay where probabilities are objec-
tive features. He formulated the link between subjective probabilities and
objective probabilities in the Principal Principle. It implies that an agent
who knows that there is an objective probability P for a particular outcome
sets her subjective probability to P .
Greaves and Myrvold [54] have reformulated Savage postulates for ra-
tionality, to suit the case of experiments performed in branching as well
as non-branching universes. The following quote formulated the purpose
of their investigation. – “The problem is not one of deriving the correct
probabilities within the theory; it is one of either making sense of ascribing
probabilities to outcomes of experiments in the Everett interpretation, or of
finding a substitute on which the usual statistical analysis of experimental
results continues to count as evidence for quantum mechanics.”
Greaves and Myrvold arrived at the same expression as Savage for an
agent’s expected utility that the agent should seek to maximize the expected
utility6,
〈U〉 =
∑
b
wbUb, (39)
where Ub is the numerical value of the utility the agent gets at the outcome b.
The wb is a weight that the subjects assigns to the outcome b. In the case of
6The 〈 〉 notation can be read as probabilistic expectation value or a quantum average.
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that, there is a single outcome, and it is the subjects subjective probability
or credence of the outcome. In the case of a branching universe, Greaves
and Myrvold call it quasi-credence. Fundamentally, it has to be a subjective
property, precisely as the probability is. In both cases, the values of the
weights are well-defined if the agent is rational. The weights are subject to
the condition
∑
bwb = 1.
If new information is presented, they are updated according to the
Bayesian update expression,
wc|b =
wb∧c
wb
. (40)
The value of wc|b give the agents belief about the weight of outcome c in
a measurement under the condition that b has been measured in another
experiment, while wb∧c is the weight for the combined outcome b and c. One
particular updating situation is when a particular value has been measured.
If the concept of probability is believed to apply, the probability of seeing
that value is updated to one. That is the agent believes there is an only
possible outcome when she knows the outcome. According to Everett, after
the branching the observer’s descendants experiences as if its branch is the
world. After the measurement value is known, the rational agent/observer
will set the corresponding quasi-credence to one, wb|b = 1. Likewise, for
practical reasons the agent will after a branching normalize the quantum
state of her branch to have amplitude one if she is to calculate future events.
Greaves and Myrvold assume that de Finetti’s infinite exchangeability
can be used for repeated experiments. By this, they have arrived at we are
entitled to use the same Bayesian statistical analysis of the branching world
as for the non-branching. For example, the expression for the probability
of Pu (37) is applicable. They argue that de Finetti’s theorem, contrary to
de Finetti’s position, provides us with the notion of objective weights. In
the case of a single outcome, they are called chance, while in the branching
world case Greaves and Myrvold use the term branching-weights.
Greaves and Myrvold assume that the EQM Born rule was already
proven, which gives the branching-weights equal to ρu. They use the Bayesian
updating of the quasi-credence on the results of the collective data, which
has been taken as evidence of Copenhagen style quantum mechanics.
Here, the Born rule is not assumed, but it is taken as a possibility that an
agent considers some weights that only depend on the state there are weights
for branches that only depend on the part of the measured state that ends
up in the branch. The agent is supposed to be rational as defined by the
axioms that Greaves Myrvold defined. The agent might be unsure about
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which is the quantum state at hand such that a mixed state density matrix
gives the weights. The branching-weights and classical probabilities are two
kinds of weights, but they obey the same mathematical relations. The mixed
state is trivial to handle once the branching-weights are understood. It is
henceforth assumed that the wavefunction is known to the agent.
The power of using decision theory is particularly evident when it is
used consistently in many decisions. For simplicity, consider an agent that
anticipates many identical branchings with identical utilities. If in a single
event the expected utility is given by
〈U〉1 = wuUu + w¬uU¬u (41)
then the expected utility after N branchings is,
〈U〉N =
N∑
m=0
w(m :N |u)(mUu + (N −m)U¬u) (42)
= N(wuUu + w¬uU¬u) = N〈U〉1. (43)
Here, it has been assumed that the utilities Uu and U¬u can be summed.
The quantity w(m : N |u) is the agent’s total weight for the collection of
branches where the value u appears m times,
w(m :N |u) = N !
(N −m)!m! (wu)
m(w¬u)N−m. (44)
The multiplicative form of weights of branches after multiple independent
branchings can be seen from the expression (40), with wc|b = wcfor indepen-
dent branchings. From w(m :N |u) a frequency distribution of the weights
w(z|u) is arrived at in the same way as ρ(z|u) (29).
When the agent makes a rational decision, she has to make a forecast
about the properties of the future. In a single world theory, this amounts
to finding the probability distribution of the different outcomes. In EQM it
is about finding the presence distribution for the different branches, which
answers where the world will be in the future.
The functional form of w(m :N |u) and w(z|u) are identical to that of
ρ(m :N |u) and ρ(z|u), respectively. A rational agent that believes in EQM
will have to put wu, the weight of branch u, equal to ρu, the presence of
branch u, at least for the wavefunction she thinks is the likely one. If she
puts her weights wu different from ρu and ρ¬u, for large N values she will
have hardly any presence where she expected to have most of her presence.
The frequency distribution from repeated measurements gives what the
‘probabilities’ have to be if they exist. The Greaves-Myrvold theory explains
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that there is a quantity that plays the same role in decision making as sub-
jective probabilities do, quasi-credence. Correspondingly, there is a quantity
that corresponds to the objective probability of the Born rule of the Copen-
hagen or the standard interpretation. It is the presence ρu, the amount at
which the system is at that value. There is a property w called weight, that
can be a credence, a subjective probability, or a quasi-credence, a subjec-
tive presence. Whether it is credence or quasi-credence, it is updated in
the same way and thus give rise to the same mathematical appearance. It
walks and looks and smells like a probability, so some might be bold and
call it a probability. Its version in the branching situation, quasi-credence
or presence are more precise terms, but quantum probability is the generic
term that can be used independently of interpretation.
There is no need for a classical uncertainty when the agent is considering
different possible decisions related to a branching situation. The agent has
a situation that warrants similar considerations as if the agent is uncertain
about a single outcome. Greaves and Myrvold showed, how the similarity
implies that the rational agent will maximize the expected utility. This
process makes the values of the weights and well-defined and the numerical
values of the utilities well-defined up to an affine transformation.
In section 5.3, it was shown that the postulate EQM1 produces a the-
ory such that all the evidence for the Born rule is evidence for this theory.
In this section, it has been shown that presence is the quantity that corre-
sponds to the objective probability present in the Born rule. From those
considerations, it should be clear that all aspects of statistical analysis, such
as determining an unknown quantum state, can be performed using the
concepts and steps presented above. All aspects of the Born rule that are
necessary, are present.
The picture that emerges is the equality of equal amount of presence, in
a similar way to Laplace principle of fundamentally equal probabilities.
The dynamics are represented by current densities (presence currents) in
configuration space. How the presence currents go into the different branches
when they emerge, give the presence distribution of the branches. Thus,
gives the apparent probabilities. This ties to the current view of section 5.1.
5.5 Responses to the Criticism of the Decision Theory by
Greaves and Myrvold
As the argumentation relies on the work by Greaves and Myrvold, the crit-
icism against it need to be addressed.
Kent [55] criticizes Savage postulates that Greaves and Myrvold used,
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which identified as necessary requirements for an agent to be rational. Kent
argues that there are many possible strategies that are in conflict with the
postulates, but are rational. He list eight different strategies, one of them
the Savage rational, the others are alternative strategies that do not conform
to Savage postulates. He claimed that the alternative strategies are rational,
but he only argued that those strategies can be applied consistently, which
is not the same as rational. It is possible to consistently act in an irrational
manner.
Two if his alternative strategies are not sufficiently well-defined enough
but the others can easily be seen to be irrational. For example, the strategy
to chose the option that maximizes the minimum reward that is given in
any branch. Consider the following two offers: 1) the agent is offered a
very low reward (u = 1) in an outcome which has extremely low weight
(w = 10−100), and a very high reward (u = 106) for all other outcomes; 2)
the agent is offered a reward slightly higher than the low reward (u = 1.1) for
all outcomes. The suggested strategy implies the agent chooses alternative
2, even if more extreme values of weights and rewards are given. It cannot be
considered rational to stick with this strategy, no matter what the weights
and the rewards are. Additionally, this is a strategy for which the weights
are irrelevant. The other well-defined alternative strategies can be shown
to be irrational in a similar way. They are all partly insensitive to the
values of the weights. If an agent does not care about the probabilities we
cannot learn about them from her actions. If no one cares, the Born rule is
unimportant.
With the intent to criticizs the concept of branch-weight, Kent sug-
gest five different computer-generated branching worlds CBU1−4 and CBU-
qualia. All the worlds have a machine with a red button and tape on which
the machine writes numbers. Pressing the button causes a new number to
be written on the tape. The problem with Kent’s analysis of these worlds
is illustrated by his claims about CBU1−3 and CBU-qualia. Here N new
worlds are copies of the previous world but get an additional number on the
tape, 0− (N − 1), respectively. Kent claims there is no branch-weights7 in
these models. It might have been his intention when the models were con-
ceived, but upon examination the opposite seems to be true. Kent agrees
that after many branchings the inhabitants can make statistics. Looking at
the worlds from the outside one will find that in the overwhelming majority
of the worlds the inhabitants will fing that a new branch has weight close
7Branch-weight seems the most appropriate term here. It is the term that Kent uses
in the article.
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to 1/N . In fact, all new branches have the objective branch-weight 1/N .
In CBU4 the number of new worlds varies at ‘the whim of the simulators’
such that it is impossible for the inhabitants to make any sense of it. In
CBU3 there is a number written in the sky which corresponds to the weight
of that branch while in CBU2,4 the number in the sky is irrelevant. In CBU-
qualia the inhabitants are given an enhanced feeling in favor of one outcome.
Kent’s different models of branching worlds only shows that it is conceiv-
able that the universe could have been impossible or more or less difficult to
understand. However, his arguments do not imply that our world is such.
Kent’s conclusion from Greaves’ and Myrvold’s work is that “Everettians
cannot give an explanation that says that all observers in the multiverse will
observe confirmation of the Born rule, or that very probably all observers
will observe confirmation of the Born rule.” In EQM, It is true that will be
some branches with low presence where the statistics disconfirm the Born
rule. However, in a single world interpretations the Born rule implies that
there is a finite probability that we will fail to confirm the Born rule. EQM
gives that the total presence of the branches in which we should have seen
the Born rule is overwhelmingly large. For a more extended argumentation
against Kent on this point, see [56].
Price [57] is skeptical towards the existence of a situation where there
is an analog of uncertainty. As has been shown above, there is no actual
uncertainty, but there is a distribution situation to which Savage decision
theory is applicable. Uncertainty turns out not to be a necessary requirement
because the classical concept of probability is successfully replaced by the
concept presence.
Further, Price erroneously regards a person’s descendants in the different
branches, as if they are different persons. In the example ‘Legless at Bondi
beach’, he discusses the misfortune that swimmer’s choice causes to one of
his descendants as if the swimmer caused harm to another person in an
unethical way. However, the choice corresponds to a gamble that in a one
world scenario could, if unlucky, give a disastrous result. There is actually
no reason to view the decision more or less ethical to cause your self harm
with a low probability or with a low presence.
Price also questions the use of Savage type decision theory. He argues
that the decision strategy he calls “social justice” is rational but in conflict
with the decision theory Greaves and Myrvold defined. That Price strategy
should be rational is argued from the rationality of the principle for orga-
nizing societies with the same name. Again Price views the descendants as
if they are different individuals that exist together, but that is not a correct
view of the situation. See section see section 7 for a related discussion.
29
Albert [58] has been critical towards the combined efforts by Saunders,
Wallace, Greaves and Myrvold to understand probability and the Born rule
in EQM. It seems that much of the critique concerned the earlier work by
Greaves [26] on the ‘caring measure’ (=quasi-credence) replacing uncertainty
related probability and Wallace early attempts to prove the Born rule purely
from decision theory. The latter has problems which Albert discusses at
length and this criticism is further mentioned in section 6. He concludes
that also the Greaves Myrvold analysis is “unmotivated and wrong” but
his arguments rely exclusively on the lack of arguments for the values of the
(objective) quasi-credence that the Born rule give. They used the hypothesis
that the Born rule to have been proven, for example by Wallace. None of
Albert’s arguments seems to be valid against how the article by Greaves and
Myrvold enter into the present theory. On the contrary, Albert’s request
for arguments related to the relative frequencies from long sequences of
measurements is answered in the previous sections.
6 Other Approaches to the Born Rule
To get a solid argumentation for Born’s probability rule, one cannot assume
the properties of the rule beforehand. Every statement should either serve
as a postulate or be derived from possible postulates.
In this section, several attempts to prove Born’s rule in ways that could
suit EQM are discussed with respect to what is proved and what is explicitly
or implicitly assumed.
6.1 Finite repetitions
In Everett’s own proof [10], he shows that the observer in a repeated mea-
surement will see a random series of results in each branch. He then con-
cludes that “we must put some sort of measure (weighting) in the elements
of a final superposition”. Everett assumes that the measure only depends on
the (absolute) value of the amplitudes cb (13), which implies that the mea-
sure is independent of other properties of the state. Further, he assumes the
measure of a state should be the sum of measures of its orthonormal basis
states. By this, Everett arrives at the measure µ which is the Born rule
probability measure µb = ρb. He compares with the probability measure of
statistical mechanics and finds that is equally justified in view of the “con-
servation of probability” that the sum of the measure of the future branches
equals the measure of the current branch. In addition to that the theory
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has not been given any contact with physical reality, to simply show that
there is a measure falls short of explaining the appearance of probabilities.
Graham [59] has tried to derive Born’s rule using arguments that in
effect are based on the narrowing of the relative frequency distribution (29).
He shows that in the limit N → ∞ the variance of the frequency operator
FN (32), (∆NFN )
2 =N 〈ψ|(FN − ρu)2|ψ〉N , tends to zero. As the Born
rule postulate C4 have been abandoned, ρ(z|a) is left without interpretation
which implies (∆NFN )
2 has no interpretation either. To let the Born rule
give it meaning, would result in a circular proof [60, 61, 62]. Note that, the
procedure of taking the limit N → ∞ only deals with quantities at finite
N values. Without a physical interpretation of (∆NFN )
2 at finite N the
limiting procedure will have no physical significance.
6.2 Infinte Repetitions
To prove the Born rule, Hartle [63] and Farhi, Goldstone, Gutmann [61, 64]
start from C1-3. The postulate C4, the Born rule, have been replaced with
(C4’): When the system state is an eigenstate to the operator B corre-
sponding to the property to be measured, the measurement result will with
certainty be the eigenvalue to the operator.
They take a frequentist approach and prove that
|ψ〉∞ =
∞∏
i=1
|ψ〉i (45)
is an eigenstate to the corresponding frequency operator,
F∞ = lim
N→∞
FN . (46)
The state (45) belongs to the Hilbert space H⊗∞, the tensor product of
infinitely many single system Hilbert spaces. The proofs are complicated as
H⊗∞ is non-separable, see the appendix. For example, Squires [40] mistakes
the fact that all the ρ(m :N |u) values approach zero as N goes to infinity,
to show that we cannot deduce anything about the properties of the state
|ψ〉∞ with regard to the frequency observable.
Caves and Schack [60] have correctly criticized the proof by Fahri, Gold-
stone and Gutmann for lack of rigor, but their criticism of the proofs by
Gutmann [64] and Hartle [63] seems not correct. Since, an additional proof
along a more mathematically complicated route has been given by van We-
sep [65]. He also disproved the claim by Caves and Schack that another
norm, then the Hilbert norm, would give another result.
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Wada [66, 67] avoided the use of the frequency operator by focusing on
the density as function of the relative frequency ρ(z|u). He considered the
state |ψ〉∞, but only from the first N states to then take the limit N →∞
and proved that in the limit, the density vanishes if z 6= ρu. In order for this
result to suffice, Wada formulated an alternative somewhat vague postulate,
where u need not correspond to a state in Hilbert space. What the ‘variable’
u instead corresponds to was not defined.
As Caves and Schack notes, even if the mathematics is correct, there
are difficulties to deduce probability from the relative frequency of infinite
sequences, [43, 18]. What does an infinite sequence say about a finite se-
quence? How is it possible to derive a probability from a certainty? This
depends on the context ultimately given by the set of postulates. The pos-
tulate C4’ gives no information when the quantum state is not an eigenstate
to the operator of the measurement, which is the situation where the Born
rule applies. What the proofs give is that, if probabilities apply, then the
Born rule gives the right values. There is no information about how or why
probabilities apply.
The mathematical proofs [63, 64, 65, 66], can probably be extended to
an infinite product of states entangled with the environment. This would
add another element of consistency to the theory presented in this article.
6.3 Envariance
Zurek [68, 69, 70, 71] use the invariance that exists in systems entangled
with the environment that he denotes envariance. Zurek’s proof is based
on four postulates [70, 71] (o)-(iii). In short, (o) and (i) corresponds to C1,
(ii) the time evolution is unitary, and (iii) subsequent measurements on the
same system yield the same outcome. The last postulate invites the same
question that the Copenhagen interpretation fails to answer, what is meant
by ‘measurement’. Zurek evades standard decoherence theory as it relies
on the Born rule. There are several different proofs given in [68] all based
on assumptions, that Zurek largely left unproven. The proof given in the
Physics Today article [70] is discussed here.
In short, Zurek’s proof fokus on the entangled system that appears when
the state |φ〉 = (|a〉+ |b〉)/√2 is entangled with the measurement apparatus
A. The entangled state is transformed with the unitary transformation
US = |a〉〈b|+ |b〉〈a|,
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉|A1〉+ |b〉|A2〉)→ (47)
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1√
2
(|b〉|A1〉+ |a〉|A2〉) = |Ψ〉. (48)
In |Ψ〉 the probability for |a〉 is as probable as |A1〉 and |b〉 is as probable
as |A2〉. In |Ψ〉, Zurek claims it is the other way around. The state |b〉 is as
probable as |A1〉 and |a〉 is as probable as |A2〉. This seems to make sense if
a non-disturbing measurement is followed by a transformation, but it relies
on that probabilities are not changed by the transformation. This need to
be derived from the postulates, but Zurek gives no valid argumentation for
that. Zurek considers the possibility that the probabilities of the two terms
in |Ψ〉 are different. Then, the transformation US changes the probabilities
of the states |a〉 and |b〉 as he argues that the probabilities of |A1〉 and |A2〉
are unchanged because A is “untouched”.
Zurek continues with a unitary transformation of the measurement ap-
paratus UA = |A1〉〈A2|+ |A2〉〈A1|, which transforms back again |Ψ〉 → |Ψ〉.
Zurek concludes that UA did not change the probabilities for the states |a〉
and |b〉 as that system is untouched. But the entangled state is back to
its original form so the probabilities must be the same as before the swaps.
Then he concludes that the probabilities of |a〉 and |b〉 are “exchanged yet
unchanged. Therefore, they must be equal to 1/2.”
The second transformation is very strange. If A is really a measurement
apparatus, it would violate the irreversibility of decoherence. It is a trans-
formation of a branch to become the other branch and vice versa. If it is a
pre-measurement, then Zurek discussed a system to be measured for which
probabilities not yet apply. Anyhow, Zurek give no valid argument that
can be used to conclude how probabilities are affected or not by the unitary
transformations.
Perhaps Zurek had in mind transformations that happen before the en-
tanglement with the apparatus. In this case one could argue that the proba-
bilities are equal for |a〉 and |b〉, if one assumes that unitary transformations
do not change the probabilities. It may seem reasonable to assume that
probabilities are not changed by unitary transformations. But, if that is
assumed, it has to be derived from the postulates, which requires that the
postulates are chosen such that it is possible. As the norm is the only
invariant, the Born rule follow easily if probabilities are known to be un-
changed under a general unitary transformation and they are properties of
the quantum state8.
Zurek relies on Laplace idea about probabilities which is that certain
states of the system have equal probability. This misses out that proba-
8Gleason’s theorem [72] is a more general statement, the proof of which is not trivial.
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bilities pertain to the possible results of a process and its properties may
important. It makes a big difference if I toss a dice or if I simply put it down
[18].
Zurek only views the different ways to understand the concept of proba-
bility in classical contexts. He never considers how the notion of probability
can be understood when ‘everything happens’, which is the case according
to his postulates.
6.4 Self-Locating Uncertainty
Vaidman [21, 22] has argued that the observer might come into a situation
of true uncertainty, after the measurement has been recorded by the detec-
tor and before the observation of its result. In the situations that Vaidman
discussed the observer’s location in space varied with the measurement re-
sult. As the detector has recorded the measurement, the splitting into new
branches has already occurred. The observer has not yet observed her loca-
tion and it is argued that she is then uncertain in which branch she is in,
or more accurately, her descendants are uncertain in which branch they are
located.
This post-measurement and pre-observation uncertainty is denoted ‘self-
locating uncertainty’, a term taken from discussions on classical probability
[73]. Vaidman has argued that the observer’s self-locating uncertainty is the
necessary and sufficient requisite for the notion of (classical) probabilities to
apply.
6.4.1 Carroll and Sebens
Carroll and Sebens [74, 75] has taken Vaidman’s analysis and combined
it with a principle they formulate called Epistemic Separability Principle,
ESP. In their shorter article [74], they give a simplified description ESP “the
probability assigned post-measurement/pre-observation to an outcome of an
experiment performed on a specific system shouldnt depend on the physical
state of other parts of the universe”. One objection against ESP is that
it assumes that EQM describes the world as we see it, while that is what
should be proven. Another objection is, to distinguish between different
parts as system, detector and environment, a fundamental interpretation of
the quantum state is needed.
Leaving that aside, there is still severe problems with their proof of the
Born rule. Two ‘alternate scenarios’ are considered in which there is a spin-
1
2 particle with its spin in the x-direction and an environment consisting
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of a coin9 and the rest Ω. The environment detect the spin value in the
z-direction. Before the observation, the state is either
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
|O〉| ↑〉|H〉|Ω1〉+ 1√
2
|O〉| ↓〉|T 〉|Ω2〉, (49)
or
|Ψ2〉 = 1√
2
|O〉| ↑〉|T 〉|Ω2〉+ 1√
2
|O〉| ↓〉|H〉|Ω1〉. (50)
where O is the observer that have not yet observed and H and T are the two
states of the coin. Similarly to Zurek they assume that a unitary transfor-
mation of the measured system does not change the probabilities. As noted
previously, this cannot be assumed but need to be derived.
Kent [76] questions the interpretation Carroll and Sebens give to the
states (49) (50), that the observer O is in different branches, though the
observer is not entangled
|Ψ1〉 = |O〉( 1√
2
| ↑〉|H〉|Ω1〉+ 1√
2
| ↓〉|T 〉|Ω2〉). (51)
Sebens’ and Carroll’s view is that the state (51) describes an observer that
is located in one or the other branch . Their view is that “branching hap-
pens throughout the whole wave function whenever it happens anywhere”.
However, how the words ‘branch’ or ‘branching’ are used does not change
the physical content of the theory. The physical state 51 is not that of
an observer that is classically uncertain but of somebody whose state will
‘fission’ at the time of observation.
There is a situation which Sebens and Carroll bring up, where it is less
obvious that Kent’s criticism apply but McQueen and Vaidman argues it
does. The point they bring up turns out to be of particular interest, as
it actually constitutes an important argument against Born rule proof of
McQueen and Vaidman, section 6.4.2.
Sebens and Carroll argued that there is a moment of self-locating uncer-
tainty during the short time between that the observer’s retina has registered
a result and that the observer is mentally aware of the result. McQueen and
Vaidman argues that the system O should only be the observers “cognitive
system”. For clarity and later reference lets write this state vector, where
the observer O is viewed as two systems, M for mind and B for body
|Ψ1〉 = |M〉( 1√
2
|B↑〉| ↑〉|H〉|Ω1〉+ 1√
2
|B↓〉| ↓〉|T 〉|Ω2〉). (52)
9In [75] there are two detectors. One of them corresponds to the coin.
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The observer’s mind does not belong to any of the two branches yet.
The situations that Carroll and Sevens consider are quantal in nature and
classical notions of uncertainty and probability cannot be applied without
substantial further reasoning.
6.4.2 McQueen and Vaidman
Vaidman [21, 32] has previously postulated the Born rule and he has stated
that it seems not possible to derive the Born rule [22]. In his article together
with McQueen [77] the postulate reads “The probability of self-location in
a world with a given set of outcomes is the absolute square of that worlds
amplitude.” They motivate it by “This postulate is needed to explain ob-
served frequencies of outcomes of quantum experiments.” However, in spite
of postulating the Born rule, McQueen and Vaidman also attempts to prove
the Born rule, why we should regard the postulate as a theorem instead.
They consider the very special situation in which the observer is asleep
during measurement and is placed in different identically looking rooms
depending on the outcome of the measurement. When the observer wakes
up, she is ignorant about in which room she is located and, correspondingly,
what the outcome was.
The criticism that McQueen and Vaidman made against Carroll and
Sebens view that the observer’s mind is in self-locating uncertainty when
the retina has registered the measurement result, but the observer is not yet
aware of the result, also constitutes an argument against the appearance of
classical uncertainty for their observer as well. The state (52) also applies to
the situation where the body is in different positions. That the mind has the
same state but is located in two different positions is, from fundamental point
of view, no different from an electron being distributed onto two different
locations with the same spin state at both positions.
Albert [58] and Lewis [78] criticize that the self-location uncertainty
arguments give probabilities that come too late in the game. They do not
properly address the pre-measurement situation. McQueen and Vaidman
answer this question with that Vaidman’s ‘measurement of existence’ “which
may make pre-measurement agents care more about descendants that exist
more”. That agrees with the point of view of EQM1 and section 5.4, but
they refer to Vaidman’s article [21] where he postulates that the ‘measure of
existence’ gives the probability, but that is quite different from explaining
it.
McQueen and Vaidman assume that measurements that take place at
one location do not affect what happens at another location, this is also an
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essential part of the argumentation in the present analysis of measurements,
section 3 which was also present in an early version [79].
6.5 Wallace Decision Theory
Wallace has vigorously pursued to derive the Born rule in EQM inspired
by Deutsch attempt to derive the Born rule from decision theory. In his
book on EQM [18], Wallace reproduces his very elaborate attempt to prove
the Born rule, first published in 2010 [51]. He defines EQM as a theory of
states that belong to a Hilbert space, which is defined by a set of operators
that act on it, for example, position operators for individual particles. More
generally, he refers to quantum field theories and their definition [80].
He argues against the circularity of proving the Born rule from deco-
herence that Joos [36] identified. Wallace states that the Hilbert norm is
“telling us when some emergent structure really is robustly present” and
“a perfectly objective feature of the physics, prior to any considerations of
probability”. Wallace also refers to relations between dynamical features
and the norm. Here, Wallace interprets the norm to have a physical sig-
nificance. This interpretation is in accordance with EQM1, but his theory
is not defined from such a statement, but instead from assuming Hilbert
space. As noted in section 2, it is conceivable to derive postulate EQM1
from the Hilbert space structure. The backward character of starting with
mathematics to get physics makes it difficult to be firmly convinced by such
a derivation. Wallace does not derive EQM1, and he seems not to appreci-
ate the significance of the quantity ρ·(·), as can be seen from his arguments
against a frequentist derivation of the Born rule. He states “mod-squared
amplitude of all branches on which the relative frequencies are not approx-
imately correct will tend to zero. And of course this is circular: it proves
not that mod-squared amplitude equals relative frequency, but only that
mod-squared amplitude equals relative frequency with high mod-squared
amplitude.” There is no reference here to the norm, ‘mod-squared’, as a
significant quantity from which conclusions on physics can be drawn. Wal-
lace seems not sufficiently convinced about the significance of the norm, to
also use it for conclusions about probabilities. This uncertainty is the con-
sequence of postulating the Hilbert space structure, rather than EQM1, the
physical significance of the quantity ρ·(·) is not easily understood.
The decision theory that is used to prove the Born rule proof is based on
six rationality ‘axioms’ labeled: ordering, diachronic consistency, microstate
indifference, branching indifference, state supervenience, solution continuity
and four richness axioms that assumes that the world is sufficiently versatile.
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The axioms and the proof are quite complex. It has been examined [81] and
so far, no objections have been raised on the proof. However, the axioms
have been questioned [82, 83, 84]. Here is the trouble of Wallace’ approach,
if this is going be a valid proof of the Born rule, then the ‘axioms’ should
be as easily acceptable as Savage axioms or those of Greaves and Myrvold.
Savage axioms of rational are rules that a rational agent will follow, but
they do not directly define the values of the probabilities. It is the agent’s
view of the world around her that result in probability values. The com-
bination of rational behavior and knowledge about the quantum structure
is enough to prove the Born rule, as shown in section 5. For the Deutsch-
Wallace program to become convincing, it is necessary to prove that Savage
type axioms and EQM lead to Wallace axioms, or similar.
Kent [55] and Dawid and The´bault [85] criticized Wallace Born rule
derivation for the ‘fuzziness’ of the branch definition. The point is that the
observer’s beliefs can then not give a well-defined Born rule. The answer is
important, in EQM the measurement is described as a physical process. The
fuzziness of branches is the fuzziness of actual measurements. It is generally
assumed that the experiments can be made arbitrarily exact, in principle.
If that is not the case, several interpretations will be in trouble.
7 What is Real?
Some criticism of the derivations of the Born rule goes deep into how EQM
describes the world. For example, Hemmo and Pitowsky [86] contrast the
standard quantum mechanics where one alternative become “realized” with
EQM where “all of them are real”. Price [57] wrote about EQM that “all
possible outcomes of a quantum measurement are treated as equally real.”
With such views, it is no wonder that they come to that the Born rule is a
logical impossibility. If we know for sure that something will happen, then
it has probability one.
The EQM description of a single particle is a spatially varying amplitude
for each spin component. Its absolute square ρj(x) gives the locations of the
particles, which is a distribution. If the particle is in a bound state, it can
be probed with forces. The strength of the interactions will reveal the values
of ρ in different regions (and spins).
Is the quantum particle equally real at all positions where the amplitude
is non-zero? The question is based on a mistake of category. A quantum
particle is not that kind of thing which is localized to a single spot. The
same is true for complex systems as well. They are not localized to a single
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point in configuration space and spin, but a distributed quantity.
When a system becomes entangled with the environment, the combined
system becomes very complex indeed. Nevertheless, it is still a distributed
system. It is still a category error to state that it is equally real at all
the positions where the amplitude (or ρ) is non-zero, as the system is not
localized to a specific position. If the entanglement with the environment
leads to many different branches, it is still a category error to think that the
system is equally real at the different branches. It is distributed, and it is a
mistake to view it as if there are copies of it in the different branches. This
is so as long as we view the whole set of branches as the total system.
When the perspective is taken to be that of an observer that observed
and so become entangled in the same way as the system is, the perspective
needs to be that within a single branch in order to understand the observer’s
continued observations. The perception the observer’s descendants have
is that of the branch she is in, where everything consistently is as if the
measured system’s initial state was the corresponding component |b〉. On
the other hand, before the measurement our view is that of the system
as a whole. We envisage all the possibilities, all the future branches that
constitute the positions over which the (single) system will be distributed.
From the pre-measurement perspective, the future observer’s experience
of the system being in a specific branch is a mirage. The views expressed
by Hemmo, Pitowsky, and Price that “all of them are real” corresponds to
viewing mirages as if they are real.
8 Conclusions and Final Remarks
The postulate EQM1 gives a physical foundation to Everett’s quantum me-
chanics. It gave that the quantum state belongs to a Hilbert space and an
extraordinary simplicity of the postulates. Additionally, the relation with
observation with macroscopic-classical phenomena is equally simple.
The relation to the observation of microscopic-quantal phenomena is
a complex process as it involves decoherence. The existing formulations
of decoherence theory are based on the Born rule. EQM1 interprets the
quantity appearing in the Born rule, ρb to give to what extent the system is
present at b. When decoherence theory gives that the amplitude of coherent
effects is vanishingly low, that means that the presence of coherent effects
is vanishingly small.
The physical description of measurements assumes that interactions are
essentially that of the standard model of particle physics. This assumption
39
allows for the assumption of that particle recording detectors only react to
the part of the measured state that falls upon the detector. There is no
need to explain the measurement process under various hypothetical types
of interactions that might not even allow for the construction of detectors.
The need for assumptions in order to address probabilities have been dis-
cussed by Barrett [46]. Much of the discussions of measurements and the
Born rule have gone astray in unnecessarily general and abstract reasonings.
The cause for this may be the heritage of classical mechanics and quantum
mechanics textbooks where the mechanics and the interactions are two com-
pletely independent entities.
The analysis of the statistics from repeated measurements implies that
physicist in the typical branch believes in the Born rule. Observations con-
firm that physicist believes in the Born rule. The possibility that we are
not in a typical branch is, of course, possible, precisely as it is possible that
the actual probabilities are entirely different from the Born rule, the data in
support of it are a ‘statistical mishap’.
From the theory, we get the expectations that we should see the Born
rule, and we have. All the data that verify the Born rule also verify EQM.
Greaves and Myrvold introduced the idea of a quantity quasi-credence
that is the pre-measurement analog to the credence an agent has to the
different outcomes. The agent/physicist that believes in EQM and is aware
of the statistical analysis will put her quasi-credence values equal to the
presence distribution ρb, which is the same as values as the Born rule prob-
abilities. Operationally, there is no difference between Born rule probability
in a single world theory and presence. The presence appears in statistical
analysis and decision making in the way as the notion of probability does
in single world theories. In order to make the notation more similar in be-
tween interpretations, the presence may be called ‘Everettian probability’
or simply probability, when ‘Everettian’ can be tacitly understood.
It is possible to take the quantum state as the full description of the
physical world without any additional degrees of freedom or mechanisms
that select a single value in a measurement. All aspects of the measurement
process are fully understood using Everett’s interpretation with EQM1 and
EQM2. This fact explains the elusive character of the measurement problem
that made Feynman doubt its existence and some to suggest that a selection
happens without a cause [87].
Interpretations, like Everett’s, that describe the measurement process
are more complete theories than those that do not. They are also more
vulnerable, as the description can be disproven. EQM can be disproven if
measurements can be performed without decoherence. On the other hand,
40
all other interpretations will be disproven if effects of recoherence are de-
tected. Experimental tests of quantum mechanical processes related to mea-
surements and locality and other factors are necessary.
I wish to acknowledge Ben Mottelson, David Wallace, Robert Geroch
and Lev Vaidman for stimulating discussions and useful suggestions
APPENDIX
Hilbert Spaces
A Hilbert space H is a normed linear space [88]. The members are often
called vectors. The norm ‖ · ‖ attributes a real number ≥ 0 for any member
in H. The normed space has the property that
‖x‖ = 0⇔ x = 0. (53)
This implies that
‖x− x′‖ = 0⇔ x = x′. (54)
An example, the equation for an eigenvalue a of a linear operator A is
Ax = ax⇔ ‖Ax− ax‖ = 0. (55)
For a Hilbert space consisting of functions (Rn → C, n ∈ N or n = ∞) the
functions make up equivalence classes. Two functions ψ and ψ′ belong to
the same equivalence class if they are equal almost everywhere in the sense
‖ψ − ψ′‖ = 0. The vectors of the Hilbert space are the equivalence classes.
If it is clear that we deal with vectors in Hilbert space, then the statement
ψ = ψ′ means ‖ψ − ψ′‖ = 0.
The most important property of Hilbert spaces is the existence of an
inner product 〈x|y〉 which is related to the norm by ‖x‖2 = 〈x|x〉. Further-
more, 〈x|y + λz〉 = 〈x|y〉+ λ〈x|z〉 and 〈y|x〉 = 〈x|y〉∗.
Hilbert spaces are complete, and spaces with an inner product can be
completed to become a Hilbert space. Any Hilbert space has a complete
orthonormal basis set.
In separable Hilbert spaces, the basis set is countable. Then any vector
ψ can be written as a sum of the basis states φb,
ψ =
∑
b
〈φb|ψ〉φb (56)
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This equation holds only in the sense of the equivalence (54). If ‖ψ−ψ′‖ =
0, then the matrix elements 〈φb|ψ〉 = 〈φb|ψ′〉. Both ψ and ψ′ give rise to the
same lefthand side.
The Hilbert space for a finite number of particles is separable. The
Hilbert space for infinitely many particles H⊗∞ = H ⊗H ⊗ ..., which is an
infinite tensor product of separable Hilbert spaces. This space is not sepa-
rable so that any complete basis set will be uncountable. The non-separable
character can result in that the inner product 〈φ|ψ〉 between normalized
basis states φ and the normalized state ψ all are zero. At most a countable
set of inner products can be non-zero.
The left hand side of (3) defines a norm and there is a unique inner
product
〈Ψ|Φ〉 =∫ ∫ · · · dx1dx2 · · ·∑j ψj(t,x1,x2, . . .)∗φj(t,x1,x2, . . .).
(57)
As stated in the comment to EQM1, there is no observable difference
between Ψ and Ψ′ if ‖Ψ−Ψ′‖ = 0. This equivalence shows that the Hilbert
space vector represents all (observable) physical properties of the system.
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